“Like if you get a hotel bill”: Consumer Logic, Pay-to-Stay, and the Production of Incarceration as a Public Commodity

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ABSTRACT

Neoliberal governance has become a defining feature of our social world, fast-tracking the commodification of human interaction, particularly within capitalist economies. Neoliberalism's intensification of capitalist social relations shifted social institutions such as education, healthcare, and criminal justice to resemble profit-oriented enterprises. A preeminent consequence of this shift for the administration of criminal justice is the rapid expansion of monetary sanctions in the form of pay-to-stay fees. Our article contributes to scholarship on neoliberal governance and social institutions by exploring how lawmakers justify and frame the imposition and recoupment of pay-to-stay fees. We draw from a novel dataset compiled by the authors on pay-to stay in the State of Illinois, which consists of state-level pay-to-stay statutes, transcripts of legislative debates on the ratification of pay-to-stay statutes, and 102 civil complaints from 1997-2015 initiated on behalf of the Illinois Department of Corrections against currently and formerly incarcerated people to compel the payment of pay-to-stay fees. Our analysis suggests that in the era of neoliberal governance, consumerism is an institutional logic that lawmakers draw from to adopt pay-to-stay as a legal template in an effort to foster a producer-consumer relationship between incarcerated people and the state, thereby producing incarceration as a public commodity.

Keywords: neoliberalism, commodification, consumerism, monetary sanctions, pay-to-stay, legal templates

INTRODUCTION

Neoliberal governance has become a defining feature of our social world, fast-tracking the commodification of human interaction, particularly within capitalist economies. Capitalist social relations have long been the subject of sociological inquiry, with Marx and Engles (1848) noting over a century ago that the "commodification of human society could be seen essentially as a manifestation of the territorial expansion of capitalist relations" (Singh and Cowden 2015: 375). Neoliberalism has intensified capitalist social relations between the state and the populace by constructing the state as a benevolent public service provider and the populace as contractually indebted consumers of public goods. The rise of 1970s neo-conservatism sparked the reconfiguration of social institutions in the United States according to neoliberal "knowledge regimes" defined by rational financial principles of market deregulation and privatization. By the 1980s, states across the country increasingly governed through neoliberal design, expanding policies that shifted social institutions, such as education, healthcare, and criminal justice, to resemble profit-oriented enterprises (Campbell and Pedersen 2014). Financialization resulted in a number of consequences for the administration of criminal justice, namely the expansion of carceral solutions to control a society rocked by corporate flight, disappearing capital, and corresponding urban decay. In particular, the instrumental use of law and order crime control and resulting mass incarceration was and remains a neoliberal endeavor (Campbell and Schoenfeld 2013; Simon 2006; Schept 2015; Wacquant 2009, 2010). Much of the early and middle growth of mass incarceration was largely unfunded yet incredibly expensive and occurred at the same time that states were slashing taxes. The exponential boom in people under correctional control threatened to bankrupt state governments if they did not expand revenue generation schemes, fostering the neoliberal rise of the prison industrial complex (Donziger 1996; Gilmore 2007; Parenti 1999), defined as "a set of bureaucratic, political, and economic interests that encourage

increased spending on imprisonment" (Schlosser 1998: para 7). Many states soon realized that a rapidly expanding criminal legal system required innovative funding strategies and policy reforms to shift the cost burden away from the state and taxpayers to those categorized as criminal offenders (Aviram 2015; Buchanan 2007; Eisen 2017; Gottschalk 2010; Harris 2016; Levingston 2007; Lynch 2009; Schoenfeld 2018; Wamsley 2018; Xenakis and Cheliotis 2018).

Monetary sanctions to fund the criminal justice system and generate revenue for public expenditures more broadly are a preeminent consequence of neoliberal governance. Also known as legal financial obligations (LFOs), monetary sanctions constitute fees and user costs accumulated throughout criminal justice processing, and fines and restitution imposed at sentencing (Harris 2016). The use of pay-to-stay as a monetary sanction expanded rapidly during this period and refers to the practice of charging incarcerated people per diem and service-specific fees for the total or partial cost of their jail and/or prison confinement (Aviram 2015; Brennan Center for Justice 2019; Buchanan 2007; Friedman 2020b; Gipson and Pierce 1996; Gottschalk 2010; Eisen 2017; Jackson 2007; Kirk et al. 2020; Levingston 2007; Lynch 2009; Plunkett 2013; Weisberg 2007). Our article situates pay-to-stay within the broader impact of neoliberal governance on all social institutions, such as the widespread commodification of public goods and services and the construction of consumer relations between the state and the populace. We draw from a novel dataset compiled by the authors on pay-to stay in the State of Illinois, which consists of state-level pay-to-stay statutes, transcripts of legislative debates on the ratification of these statutes, and 102 civil complaints from 1997-2015 initiated on behalf of the Illinois Department of Corrections against currently and formerly incarcerated people to compel the payment of pay-to-stay fees. We explore how lawmakers justify and frame the imposition and recoupment of pay-to-stay fees. Our analysis suggests that in the era of neoliberal

governance, consumerism is an institutional logic that lawmakers draw from to adopt pay-to-stay as a legal template in an effort to foster a producer-consumer relationship between incarcerated people and the state, thereby producing incarceration as a public commodity. Legal templates are "individual structural modes of punishment available for authorization and replication across multiple jurisdictions" (Rubin 2019: 519), whereas institutional logics are the guiding principles and beliefs structuring institutional behavior within a given societal order, such as democratic capitalism (Friedland and Alford 1991).

COMMODIFICATION, NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE, AND INEQUALITY

Consumerism is an institutional logic that structurally and normatively prescribes human interaction as chiefly concerned with the production and acquisition of commodities. Commodities are goods and services produced to create a return on a monetary investment, requiring exchange with consumers who constitute a market. Markets structure consumer responsibility, particularly when institutional structures encourage producers to monopolize the production of goods and services to sustain their monetary interest (Fligstein 1991; Podolny 1993). "Modern states with capitalist economies create the institutional conditions for markets to be stable" (Fligstein 1996: 657), such that commodities sold within a market must be quantifiable, given social institutions trust numbers as representative of value (Espeland and Stevens 2008; Fligstein and Dauter 2017; Diaz-Bone and Didier 2016; Porter 1995). Public commodities in the United States such as compulsory education, welfare benefits, and law enforcement are exchanged between the state and populace, where the state receives validation of their power and sovereignty, while the populace receives protection and resources intended to maintain a minimum standard of living (Carnoy et al. 2014; Seldon 1998; Tilly 1990).

This market is highly unequal, given histories of colonialism, racism, and patriarchy that structure how the state provides access to public commodities, with racial and ethnic minorities, poor and working classes, women, and undocumented migrants receiving lower quality state owned goods and services (Fischer 2017). The provision of public commodities is increasingly privatized in the neoliberal era, exacerbating existing socioeconomic inequalities (Lechterman 2017). Neoliberal governance also intensifies inequality by holding people financially accountable to the state for commodities they allegedly consume, often through the mobilization of criminal justice institutions as enforcement for insufficient payment (Page and Soss 2017; Schept 2015; Wacquant 2009).

Monetary Sanctions in the Criminal Justice System

As Fligstein and Dauter (2007: 116) note, "the sociological view of the relations between producers begs the question of who these producers are and how they make production decisions." We suggest the impact of neoliberal governance on the administration of criminal justice mirrors other social institutions in that consumerism operates as an institutional logic essential to producing state functions as public commodities. We believe monetary sanctions are a fruitful site for inquiry into how neoliberal governance ultimately produces public commodities owned by the state in the form of punishment practices and outcomes, with significant implications for inequality.

Neoliberal governance emphasizes individual responsibility for the consumption of commodities and carceral expansion to punish nonpayment, two scripts which construct monetary sanctions law on the books and collectively create "statutory inequality" (Friedman and Pattillo 2019). These scripts ultimately structure the law in action with wide reaching consequences (Harris 2016; Harris et al. 2010, 2011), such as the creation of "indentured

citizens" (Page and Soss 2017). For example, the imposition and recoupment of monetary sanctions occurs through the blending of criminal, civil, and administrative law, leading to pervasive consequences that ripple beyond the realm of criminal justice. This occurs in part because a wide range of social institutions beyond the criminal justice system, such as schools and social service agencies, are annexed to produce punitive outcomes (Beckett and Murakawa 2012). Though many monetary sanctions are triggered through criminal justice contact, in the era of neoliberal governance, the consequences for non-payment often combine criminal penalties such as parole revocation and jail imprisonment, with civil and administrative penalties, such as the seizure of tax refunds and pensions, wage garnishment, reporting to credit agencies, and civil liens and lawsuits (Beckett and Murakawa 2012; Friedman 2020b; Friedman and Pattillo 2019; Henricks 2019; Page et al. 2019; Page and Soss 2017; Wamsley 2018; Worrall 2001). Private companies add another layer of punitiveness by fostering multiple additional "cost points" for people with monetary sanctions debt (Harris et al. 2019).

Ten million people in the United States collectively owe over $50 billion in monetary sanctions debt (Brennan Center for Justice 2019), placing approximately 3% of the U.S. population at risk for the multitude of consequences for nonpayment. These consequences are not only experienced by those categorized as criminal offenders, but ripple outward to severely impact their families, friends, and communities, what Harris (2016) describes as a "punishment continuum." The resulting collateral consequences lead to a cycle of "carceral immobility and financial capture" endemic to histories of state extraction from criminalized social groups (Friedman 2020a). Monetary sanctions have profound implications for how people experience criminal (in)justice (Pattillo and Kirk 2020; Pleggenkuhle et al. 2020) and socioeconomic inequality, particularly for racially and economically marginalized communities (Bannon et al.

2010; Cadigan and Kirk 2020; Cadigan and Smith 2020; Fernandes et al. 2019; Friedman and Pattillo 2019; Harris 2016; Henricks and Harvey 2017; Katzenstein and Waller 2015; Link 2019; Link and Roman 2017; Martin 2018; Miller et al. 2018; Piquero and Jennings 2017).

Pay-to-Stay and Consumer Logic

A common monetary sanction, forty-nine states with the exception of Hawaii and Washington, D.C. charge people pay-to-stay fees for the cost of incarceration to offset both general and criminal justice-related expenditures (Brennaen Center for Justice 2019). Pay-to-stay as repayment for a debt and/or punishment dates back to the colonial era in the United States (Peebles 2013); however, pay-to-stay rapidly expanded with the rise in neoliberal governance. In the face of exploding prison populations and overextended state budgets, states significantly increased their reliance on pay-to-stay and expanded the practice of holding incarcerated people responsible as the consumers of daily life necessities —charging them for telephone calls, email, commissary, medical care, and reentry-focused classes (Aviram 2015; Buchanan 2007; Gipson and Pierce 1996; Gottschalk 2010; Eisen 2017; Friedman 2020b; Jackson 2007; Kirk et al. 2020; Levingston 2007; Lynch 2009; Plunkett 2013; Weisberg 2007). Pay-to-stay creates a "captive market" (Plunkett 2013), though it is often portrayed by penal actors as non-punitive (Aviram 2015; Eisen 2014; Friedman 2020b). For example, recent sociological research has found that pay-to-stay practices are a legal template that is often adopted and replicated in states amidst moments of fiscal crisis, austerity politics, and resulting concerns over who should pay for the welfare state in the form of asylums and prisons (Kirk et al. 2020).

We build upon this existing body of scholarship and contribute to the discussion both empirically and theoretically. First, we theoretically clarify that consumerism is an institutional logic, fostering the adoption and expansion of pay-to-stay as a legal template grounded in the

neoliberal scripts of individual responsibility and carceral expansion. Scripts such as individual responsibility and carceral expansion undergird what amounts to neoliberal penology and the expansion of monetary sanctions (Friedman and Pattillo 2019). Scripts facilitate the development of institutional logics (Friedland and Alford 1991), such as consumerism, which is a dominant frame for the transformation of social institutions through neoliberal governance. We suggest scripts and resulting institutional logics are operationalized by the criminal justice system as punishment practices, which serve as what Rubin (2019) calls a legal template for institutional adoption, replication, and innovation. Second, we empirically showcase this phenomenon through the novel analysis of statutory language, legislative debates, and civil lawsuit complaints against currently and formerly incarcerated people to recoup pay-to-stay fees.

DATA AND METHODS

Research Design

This analysis is part of a larger study conducted by the three authors that involves in-depth examinations of pay-to-stay legislation and related lawsuits across multiple states. This article focuses on how lawmakers justify and frame these fees when crafting these laws and then the justifications employed when the law is put into practice through lawsuits brought against currently and formerly incarcerated individuals. We draw on the case of a single state, Illinois, to explore these questions. A case study approach is well suited to asking "how" and "why" questions such as those posed here, as well as studies that are context-dependent and deal with contemporary phenomena (Blatt and Haverland 2014; Yin 2018). These laws are common across nearly every state, but the legislation was passed at different points in time, within the unique political, organizational, and cultural contexts of each state. Through the tracing of this legislation over time and examining how the policy is utilized in the courts, this analysis reveals

how pay-to-stay exemplifies consumer logic and the requisite cultural scripts of individual responsibility and carceral expansion found in other social institutions during this shift towards neoliberal governance. As a result, we see the commodification of punishment practices (e.g. pay-to-stay) and outcomes (e.g. inability to pay monetary sanctions).

Limitations

While the study uses the best available data to bolster its findings, the project is not without its limitations. First, this study is only representative of pay-to-stay practices within the state of Illinois. While other states may pass similar reimbursement laws or operate in kind, our analysis is limited to the workings of Illinois. While we cannot generalize the dynamics of the passing of pay-to-stay legislation to other states, this case study of pay-to-stay fees in Illinois expands and generalizes on these analytic frames (Yin 2018) and contributes to the debates about the contexts and conceptualizations that make possible outcomes, such as the use of pay-to-stay (Blatter and Haverland 2014). Illinois was chosen as the centerpiece of this analysis due to its pervasive use of pay-to-stay provisions and the attention such practices have garnered (Mills and Lighty 2015). Second, we analyze a selection of pay-to-stay lawsuit complaints, from 1997-2015. Therefore, these cases may not be representative of the entire history of pay-to-stay lawsuits in the state of Illinois. It is possible that earlier iterations of the lawsuits operated differently or used justifications that differ from those identified in this article. However, our analysis does capture the contemporary circumstances of pay-to-stay provisions in a state that has made ample use of these lawsuits to recoup the costs of incarceration, especially in the period under analysis.

Study Site

Illinois provides a suitable case to examine the justifications used for pay-to-stay fees for a number of reasons (see Yin 2018). First, among both the patterns of monetary sanctions broadly and pay-to-stay specifically, Illinois has been found to be comparable to other states (Fernandes et al. 2019; Harris et al. 2017; Martin et al. 2018; Brennan Center for Justice 2019; Eisen 2014; Friedman, 2020b; Kirk et al. 2020). Second, the original passing of Illinois' pay-to-stay legislation occurred during a time of fiscal crisis in the state amidst the recession of the 1980s, a time when another state with existing pay-to-stay statutes (i.e. Michigan), expanded their use (Kirk et al. 2020), which makes the case of Illinois somewhat unique but also a suitable case to observe comparable shifts related to neoliberal discourse. Third and most importantly, the laws in Illinois provide us with an ample public record to examine legislators articulating and re-articulating their justifications over time since the law was revisited 12 times, under six different gubernatorial administration and various shifts in party control of the legislature. Changes spurred by dissatisfaction with the utility of the law, broader reorganizations to the criminal and civil code, and political pressures allow us to observe these frames employed and reinforced in different political contexts. Fourth, Illinois policy has always banned and strongly opposed the use of private state prisons and privatization of correctional systems. The costs of the system then fall solely on the state and make incarceration a strictly public commodity. This stance also leaves fewer options for cost-shifting during the period of mass incarceration and growing prison use.

Data Characteristics and Collection Procedures

This article draws from three data sources collected and compiled by the authors, with the first two sources of data examining how lawmakers crafted and framed the legislation that both created pay-to-stay fees and empowered the state to collect these fees. (I) Section 5/3-7-6 of the

Illinois Compiled Statutes (known as 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6), the statute legalizing the Department of Corrections' right to charge pay-to-stay fees and the Illinois Attorney General's right to file civil complaints against formerly and currently incarcerated individuals on behalf of the Department of Corrections to recoup the cost of incarceration. We traced the history of the statute and catalogued each iteration of the written statute using the publicly accessible online record. The statute is amended through the passing of Public Acts, with 13 Public Acts related to this portion of the statute. (II) Transcripts of legislative debates over 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6. We identified each of the bills that corresponded to the Public Act changes to the statute over time using publicly available indexes. Then we identified every recorded mention of these bills in the general assembly transcripts from both the Illinois House and Senate, with each bill appearing on at least 10 dates in the record. The third set of data concern how the law has been mobilized and enacted. (III) 102 civil complaints filed by the Illinois Attorney General's Office between 1997 and 2015 seeking to recoup these fees. We filed two FOIA requests in 2017, the first to obtain a list of all cases filed between 1980 and 2016, and the second to request the complaints filed after 2010. The resulting list showed 159 cases from 1996 to 2015, while the second request garnered 31 complaints from 2010-2015. To augment these complaints, we contacted each individual county courthouse where cases had been filed to collect an additional 71 complaints from 1997 to 2015. These complaints filed by the state include the initial lawsuit amount and exhibits outlining the breakdown of costs or "damages" for which the state is requesting compensation. The 102 complaints represent a variety of defendants and cases across time and across the state of Illinois. The number of lawsuits filed ebbed and flowed, with only 2 lawsuits in 1997 but growing to 13 in 2001, holding steady at 10 lawsuits for 2002-2003, with 11 and 12 lawsuits filed in 2004 and 2005, respectively. In 2006, there was a marked decline in cases, with 7 in 2006, 2 in 2007 and

2008, and only 1 lawsuit filed in 2010 and 2 in 2011 and 2012. 2013 and 2014 marked an upsurge with 8 cases in each year and 11 lawsuits in 2015.

While not the main focus of this analysis, as part of the larger research project we also collected the full case files and court records for 91 of the cases. These full case files include the original complaint filed by the state, exhibits from both parties, and responses from the defendants. Of the 102 lawsuit complaints analyzed, 31 were dismissed, 18 were granted in part, 35 were granted in full, and the remainder, 18, had unclear outcomes. In the lawsuits the state was seeking to recover $11,104,401 across 102 filings, however, the court only granted partial or full judgments in the amount of $1,724,397.29, which is 15.5% of the state's initial attachment requests. The judgments ranged from $62.13 at the low end to $408,608 at the high end. While the state vociferously denies any financial harm to the defendants in the text of the lawsuits, successful attachment orders can have immeasurable repercussions on the reentry process for individuals who face substantial barriers to employment, housing and access to public services due to a felony record (Bannon et al. 2010). In a few of the lawsuits, defendants detail the detrimental consequences of these lawsuits, not only for their path to reentry, but for their children and family members to whom they are still financially obligated. In addition, defendants often assert how such attachment orders will negatively affect their daily lives, inhibiting the ability to provide for their own care and treatment through medical co-pays, commissary purchases and the payment of legal filing fees.

Analysis

The authors began the analysis by reading through and writing both analytic and substantive memos on the complaints received through the FOIA requests. Each author wrote separate memos and then we followed an iterative process to exchange and build on this analysis,

identifying emerging and repeating themes. We then collected the written statute and legislative debates and followed a similar iterative memo process. The data collected from the legislature showcase justifications for why the law was necessary, how it should be enforced, and what changes would strengthen its purpose over time. Overall, this legislative history and debates are used to contextualize how lawmakers envision and justify the law on the books, revealing the underlying emphasis on incarceration as a public commodity. Within the complaints and related case documents, we see similar themes related to goods and services and consumerism rhetoric. In particular, we find considerable overlap across the data represented in two themes: the establishment of incarcerated people as individually responsible consumers and the expansion of carceral solutions to recoup pay-to-stay fees through statutory amendments. These themes ground our argument that incarceration is produced as a public commodity through applying consumer logic to punishment practices and outcomes, allowing the state to adopt pay-to-stay as a contractual agreement between incarcerated people as consumers and the state as producer.

FINDINGS: INCARCERATION AS A PUBLIC COMMODITY

The Illinois Attorney General's Office provided us with a list of 159 civil lawsuits they filed against currently and formerly incarcerated people between 1996 and 2015 on behalf of the Illinois Department of Corrections, using 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 as justification. 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 establishes that incarcerated people are "responsible to reimburse the Department for the expenses incurred by their incarceration at a rate to be determined by the Department." We traced this law to its 1981 inception in the passing of House Bill 542. The first step in establishing incarcerated people as individually responsible consumers was to create the illusion of a wealthy prisoner who should be held financially responsible for their own incarceration, lest the state allow free riders to consume their commodities. The discussion over the original

legislation reveals the operation of consumer logic, where incarceration is positioned as a commodity with numerical value. Specifically, lawmakers use the euphemism "room and board" to refer to incarceration as a state-owned product that must be paid for.

Although a few naysayers brought up the reality that the vast majority of incarcerated people are from poor, working class, and racially disenfranchised backgrounds, the lawmakers in favor of the bill proposed an infamous, millionaire prisoner who should pay the state for consuming incarceration. One lawmaker specifically named John Wayne Gacy as a representative example of the ability to pay for captive consumption (State of Illinois May 18, 1981: 88-90):

> *WOLF: ...What prompted the introduction of this legislation was that I was reading Reader's Digest sometime back and happened to note that the state of Michigan has implemented a law that they've had since 1935 which would require wealthier inmates to help pay for their room and board. What this is leveled at, Mr. Speaker, is not designed to force indigence, of course, which would be excluded from this, indigent prisoners confined to a penal institution to pay their room and board. It's an honest attempt to recover costs from those who have large assets or who have enriched themselves because of notoriety gained during their trial.*

Representative Wolf then goes on to explain that the Department of Corrections has increasing expenses with the number of parolees and people on supervised release and this bill could help offset the growing cost of incarceration.

> *WOLF: It is an amendment…which would authorize the Director to designate work or day release facilities to be used as halfway houses for parolees or persons on mandatory release. This legislation could save the Department of Corrections the cost of processing and maintenance of individuals, and the cost to keep these people in halfway houses could be offset by their paying for the food and maintenance when they get out…when they work.*

> *KATZ: It sounds very well to say that well-to-do prisoners are going to have to pay their own way. The only thing is that there are not very many prisoners who are well to do…I don't really believe that the taxpayers want to go through motions, take this kind of stance of we're going to charge wealthy prisoners and end up spending twenty times more in public funds than is ever collected.*

The bill overwhelmingly passed with 140 in favor and 12 against. This framing of the ability to pay persisted over time, with Governor Bruce Rauner using the same trope thirty-five years later in 2016, again citing John Wayne Gacy as justification for why the law remained necessary for Illinois. He promoted this argument in a public statement detailing why he vetoed legislation that would have successfully repealed the portion of 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 allowing civil lawsuits to recoup the cost of incarceration (Friedman and Pattillo 2019: 173).

By tracing the statute's history, we found that in 1987, Public Act 85-736 amended the law to create a revolving fund for the Department of Corrections to collect monies for expenses related to the care and custody of prisoners. This amendment gave the Department the ability to subpoena those suspected of having the ability to pay, while a subsequent amendment also sought to make sure the Department only pursued those they reasonably suspected to have resources, while mandating the Attorney General must investigate those suspected of having the ability to pay. The debates leading to this revision eventually expressed in Public Act 86-1320 (1990) illuminate the desire to further establish incarceration as a consumable commodity and expand carceral solutions to recoup unpaid fees, once again grounded in the room and board metaphor. To exemplify this point to his fellow lawmakers, one representative explicitly likened prison to a hotel stay in a discussion on the house floor (State of Illinois June 14, 1990: 23):

> *CULLERTON: So, what you're really saying here is if you have a situation where the director wants to require convicted people who are committed to his custody to reimburse the department for the expenses incurred by their incarceration. And he turns to the Attorney General and he says 'now you file an action.' Right now under current law the Attorney General could decide that he doesn't want to. And this would change that and say that he must…is this along the lines like if you get a hotel bill for staying in a certain facility…you send the prisoner a bill for staying in the…*
>
> *MCCRACKEN: And hope he pays.*
>
> *CULLERTON: Of course, this is a guy that doesn't want to stay in the hotel in the first place.*

> *MCCRACKEN: Yeah, yeah, so he'll probably claim that he's unable to pay. But you see this way we'll make sure that the Attorney General finds out if, in fact, he's unable to pay. It's a great system.*

The discussion of Amendment 4 suggests that in their attempts to frame incarceration as a commodity and justify pay-to-stay, lawmakers recognize that incarcerated people are actually captive consumers, structurally in that they do not have the freedom to choose which goods they consume and physically, in that they are confined within a "total institution (Goffman 1961). The lawmakers continually push for expanding carceral solutions to force payment, such as surveillance strategies to identify evidence, to hold incarcerated people responsible for their incarceration costs as though they are individually responsible consumers. Lawmakers recognize this disconnect while simultaneously calling pay-to-stay "a great system," suggesting the law is designed to extract in a coercive, yet justifiable manner when done within the bounds of consumer logic. In line with neoliberal governance, consumer logic triumphs over concerns about inequality because it successfully frames pay-to-stay fees as a mutually agreed upon contractual service between a producer state and a consumer prisoner, rather than possible predation.

Additional lawmaker justification for framing incarceration as a commodity comes from the view that incarcerated people willfully committed their crimes and thus must pay back their debt to society by returning the state's monetary investment. Numerous legal changes occurred to make this sentiment a reality such as amending the statute to make it a crime for incarcerated people to not disclose assets (Public Act 88-378: 1993), allowing the Attorney General to discover assets that might have been acquired during incarceration. The law expanded chargeable expenses to include both room and board and health costs, giving the Attorney General the explicit right to use the civil code to pursue incarcerated people as individually

responsible consumers by removing the language "[to] the extent of their ability to pay for such expenses." Removing this phrase was a deliberate attempt by lawmakers to make it more difficult for people to claim indigence (Public Act 88-679:1995), while simultaneously giving the state the ability to seize a person's federal benefits as payment (Public Act 89-428:1995).

A subsequent amendment established that incarcerated people should pay a daily rate for their incarceration as opposed to only specific costs and granted the Attorney General the ability to file claims in probate and bankruptcy courts to hold incarcerated people accountable (Public Act 90-85: 1997). All of these changes were justified in legislative debates surrounding the overall purpose of the law. On the one hand, legislative debates routinely suggest lawmakers in favor of the statute framed the law as intended to target those with large sums of money, while also making it clear that incarceration is a commodity that the state has the right to be paid for (State of Illinois May 8, 1997: 97-101):

> *MULLIGAN: I'm curious to know if this is, actually, are you trying to receive payment from prisoners to cover, like their room and board after they're [sic] incarceration.*
>
> *MCAULIFFE: In some cases it'll be like that and one example we have is in the Department of Corrections, there is a judgment which a prisoner was awarded a lottery winning of $200 thousand and right now we're paying for his stay while he's in the correctional facility and once he's able to be released he's able to keep all that money and not have to give the state back any money.*
>
> *MULLIGAN: Is there any allowance made if the person is, basically, indigent or are we just going to take the money back, or is it just in terms where they're making a profit like they wrote a book, they won the lottery?*
>
> *MCAULIFFE: The intent is just for someone who has a substantial amount of money. Anyone that's had some financial holdings or some real estate. They're not going to go after, they're not going to go after every penny. They're looking for people, gang members, drug kingpins, people that have substantial amount of money.*

However, the debates reveal considerable slippage between the concept of a "wealthy prisoner" versus simply targeting incarcerated people found to have any assets. In reality, lawmakers in

favor of the statute felt incarcerated people found to have any means were undeserving of free state provisions and therefore, indebted to a producer state that deserves to be made whole.

Lawmakers questioning the statute often did not challenge its foundation in consumer logic. For example, one representative critiqued the bill presented by Representative McAuliffe, but did not refute the claim that incarceration is a commodity nor the state's civil claim for payment. Instead, she pointed to the overlooked reality that many incarcerated people might jointly own property and thus seizing their property to pay the state might harm their dependents, which she found unfair because only the incarcerated person should be responsible for consuming incarceration:

> *MCAULIFFE: The intention of this is not to take away the home of a mother with children. What we're trying to do is get somebody that's in jail, being incarcerated, that has substantial amounts of money. Those are the people that they are going to go after.*
>
> *DAVIS: But your bill doesn't say that. I mean even the last four lines in the Bill. It appears that you are seeking those who are incarcerated to pay the debt incurred from their incarceration and I'm not saying that's a bad idea. I'm going to say it could be a very harmful idea for innocent people who have [committed] no crime, but just happened to be in a relationship with the incarcerated individual…according to this legislation, even after this person is two years deceased, they have two years in which their assets can be seized.*

Representative McAuliffe adamantly defended the language, assuring his colleagues that the Department of Corrections could and would use their discretion to not pursue certain types of assets when looking at individual cases. His claim however, overlooks that the very formulation of the original statute and its subsequent amendments are austerity measures, incentivizing the state to retrieve as much monetary return as possible from its captive consumer base.

Even after numerous statutory amendments designed to solidify the intent and expand the reach of the law, the Department of Corrections continued to have difficulty with incarcerated people disclosing all of their assets. To combat what they viewed as wrongful withholding,

lawmakers passed Public Act 92-564 (2002/2003) to expand the definition of what constitutes assets, in spite of their previous claims that the law was only meant to target those with large sums of money. This expansion made it clear that the focus was not only on lottery winnings, salaries, property, and benefits, but pensions, insurance policies. This amendment also created a standard form for asset disclosure to make the process of discovering the assets of incarcerated people that much easier. In bold writing, the form states that failure to adequately disclose assets would impact parole determination and that the incarcerated person may be asked to update the form periodically, allowing the state to uncover any assets acquired during incarceration. Figure 1 is an excerpt of this form used as evidence in a 2015 civil lawsuit against an incarcerated person to compel payment of pay-to-stay fees.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

This form (Figure 1) and the categories listed "bank/credit union accounts" "veteran's compensation," and "social security income/payments" make it clear that the state sees all assets as subject to reimbursement for incarceration. By requiring every incarcerated individual to disclose all their financial assets, even those who are already supported by the state through public benefits, incarceration is further conceptualized as a commodity being provided by the state to individually responsible consumers. Not disclosing assets is addressed through carceral means, such as the loss of good time credit and parole eligibility, essentially imposing additional days of incarceration for "stealing" from the state. We suggest this provides yet another example of the expansion of carceral solutions to compel payment on the grounds that incarcerated individuals must be held responsible for what they consume.

Similar to the legislative debates, our analysis of lawsuit complaints reveals the same consumer logic used as justification, positioning incarceration as a commodity and thus

legitimate to exchange with a consumer base. Each lawsuit begins by framing the state and more specifically, the Illinois Department of Corrections, as the provider of goods and services ranging from care and custody to treatment and rehabilitation:

> *3. Section 3-7-6(a) of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6) states, in part: 'Committed persons shall be responsible to reimburse the Department for the expenses incurred by their incarceration at a rate to be determined by the Department in accordance with this Section.'*
> *4. The Department provided care, custody, treatment, or rehabilitation to Defendant [name], within the meaning of the Illinois Uniform Code of Corrections.*
> *5. The Department provided care, custody, treatment, or rehabilitation at correctional institutions or facilities, within the meaning of the Illinois Uniform Code of Corrections.*

The language establishes that individual consumer responsibility lies with the incarcerated person and frames the Department of Corrections as simultaneously the provider and victim, requiring payment for incarceration where nonpayment constitutes civil damages. The calculated monies owed are specifically labeled the incarcerated person's "incarceration liability" throughout the civil complaints we analyzed.

As the owner and producer of incarceration, the nature and quality of the state's goods and services are not detailed in the complaints, however, the lawsuits contend that because the individual defendants utilized incarceration, the state is subject to the financial recovery of said commodity. Multiple times throughout the lawsuits, the state reiterates their stance as the provider of goods and services, while at the same time highlighting their right to be paid per contractual agreement with incarcerated people. The complaints repeatedly cite the statute and subsequent amendments to frame the individual defendants as not only responsible for the cost of incarceration, but also as active contributors to their own indebtedness, and thus liable consumers acting irresponsibly. The language used in a 2010 case in Lake County exemplifies the sentiment that incarcerated people knowingly consume incarceration by the sheer fact of being incarcerated and simply do not pay the state: "As alleged in Paragraphs 4-9 and attached

Exhibit A, the Illinois Department of Corrections has assessed $82,800.37 as the cost of [name] incarceration, but has not received any reimbursement payment." To make clear the state's right to hold incarcerated people responsible, the next immediate sentence in the complaint outlines that "The Illinois Unified Code of Corrections establishes an enforcement mechanism to recover the costs of incarceration."

The civil complaints lay out the broad strokes of goods and services rendered, saying that they provide, "care, custody, treatment or rehabilitation" to those incarcerated in their facilities. Neither the State of Illinois nor the DOC are required to provide evidence in the complaint of said care nor justifications for the increasing costs of incarceration, but instead are simply able to state to the court that they did in fact provide goods and services. Per consumer logic in the realm of social institutions, the quality of the goods and services rendered is not at issue, though recouping their numerical value from the populace turned consumer base is. The remaining questions within the complaints center on who is fiscally responsible for incarceration as a commodity and by what means the costs will be paid. For example, language from a 2014 complaint against a man in Randolph County pointedly states:

> *The Department provided care, custody, and treatment, or rehabilitation to the Defendant on or during the period of October 24, 2000 through May 31, 2014…in the sum of $270,729.51, based on the average per capita cost per day for inmates at the institutions where the Defendant was held…an itemized copy of those costs is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit A…the Director, or the Director's designee knows or reasonably believes that the Defendant has assets which may be used to satisfy all or part of a judgment rendered under this Act.*

In failing to pay these fees while allegedly having the means to do so, the complaints assert that incarcerated people are skirting their responsibility to remedy civil damages suffered by the Department of Corrections on account of unlawful consumption, as shown in a quote from the same Randolph County case: "By reason of the foregoing, the Department has suffered and

sustained damages in the Sum of $270, 729.51…Wherefore, plaintiff, People of the State of Illinois ex rel. the Director of the Department of Corrections, State of Illinois, prays for judgment in its favor and against the Defendant, in the amount of $270,729.51, plus costs and fees, and any and all additional relief of any nature and kind whatsoever as may be proper." These types of concluding statements were present in each complaint and functioned as a summary of the civil charges for the incarcerated person's unmet consumer responsibility. Following such statements, every complaint contained an affidavit signed by a certified public accountant from the Fiscal Accounting Compliance branch of the Department of Corrections, adding legitimacy through supposed objectivity as to the value assessed to incarceration, ensuring the state's right to be paid for it in civil court.

Any identifiable assets rather than wealth were enough to trigger unmet consumer responsibility by symbolizing an incarcerated person's free-rider status. The amounts of these lawsuits were often enormous, highlighting the extraordinary costs of incarceration and the often impossibility of repayment. Amounts were frequently over $100,000, as high as $609,814.75. Incarceration is then a commodity that most people in the United States would be unable to afford, much less individuals who have spent many years incarcerated. Across the complaints we examined, assets as low as $55 in the incarcerated individual's inmate trust account were enough to justify filing a lawsuit. While the state often had to subpoena financial institutions to identify the true amount of the incarcerated individual's resources and assets, the existence alone of bank accounts, inheritances, or pensions in the individual's name was used to justify the case.

Of the 73 complaints we collected in which the state was able to identify the amount of assets, the state sued for damages exceeding the total value of an incarcerated person's assets in 62 cases and sued for the total value of their assets in 4 cases. This action reveals the state knows

it will most likely be unable to recoup the full costs, and even so, still seeks to seize whatever funds the person has to prove that incarceration is a commodity and incarcerated people should meet their consumer liability to the state. This "pay whatever you can" argument is standard when filing any civil action to recoup financial damages and thus only validates the state's desire to frame and maintain incarceration as a consumable commodity.

For example, in a 2015 case from Will County, a man who had been incarcerated since 1995 was sued for $518,841, while the evidence presented to justify the suit revealed he was not wealthy and likely did not have the assets to pay for his incarceration:

> *The Department knows or reasonably believes that Defendant has possession or control over the following assets:*
> *A. A savings account at State Bank of Lincoln with a balance of $11,596.49 as of April 9, 2015.*
> *B. A securities account at Wells Fargo Shareholder Services that was initially funded with $2,500.*
> *C. A checking account at an unknown bank from which a check was drawn to fund the Wells Fargo account.*
> *D. An account at an unknown bank from which Defendant intended to wire funds to the Wells Fargo account.*
> *E. An unknown quantity of Walgreens common stock.*
> *The Department has authorized the Attorney General to pursue this action in the name of the People of the State of Illinois to recover from Defendant the amount of $518,841.00 plus statutory costs…and interest, and for any other relief that the Court deems equitable and just.*

A series of cases filed in 2014 in Lawrence County similarly reveal that people are sued for costs that way exceed their identified assets. Figure 2 shows that in one suit for $266,476.79, the person's recoverable assets only totaled $10,912.06—yet as a result of statutory guidelines in 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6, the suit allows the state to dig further into the person's financial history and seize whatever assets found along the way.

[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]

Figure 2 is the "bill" included in the complaint filed by the state for the 4,999 days of incarceration. Each complaint contains a similar breakdown of costs. Comparable to any itemized receipt, the amount is broken down to a daily charge that varies both by the cost of being incarcerated in a particular prison and being incarcerated in a given year. These bills work to assign value to the damages owed to the state. However, the state knows that the incarcerated individual in this instance could likely never be able to pay this amount as their much lower account balance, known as the "recoverable asset," is listed directly below the amount.

A 2015 case from Cook County, suggests that the inmate trust fund account, along with the offender financial status report (Figure 1), provides a significant source of financial tracking by allowing the Department of Corrections to monitor the incarcerated person's financial transactions in real time. Figure 3 provides an example of how this account is monitored. This document included a portion of the transactions within this individual's account. Prison guards have access to the amounts, the source, and the nature of the transactions.

[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]

In this case, a woman was sued for $109,905.61 while her cost of incarceration was calculated at $408,608.04. As highlighted by Figure 3, the evidence justifying the suit was a JP Morgan Chase bank account trust valued at $200,000 and a series of deposits from this trust into her inmate trust fund. Her case highlights how surveillance well beyond prison walls is necessary to recoup pay-to-stay fees. As further evidenced by data present in the larger case files, surveillance of these inmate trust fund accounts and of the mail coming in and out of the prison often alerted prison officials to possible accounts, assets, or the passing of family members. Any admission of an asset when filling out the initial financial status form, mentioned in conversation, or written in correspondence might provoke a request for reimbursement of one's incarceration liability. As

upheld in the statute and subsequent amendments, the possibility of an asset being withheld granted the state the power to bring a civil lawsuit to investigate further and attempt to uncover all assets held by an incarcerated person.

CONCLUSION

In an article from the Elko Free Press, Sheriff Jim Pitts, in discussing the necessity of charging pay-to-stay fees, said "We're not the Hilton… These guys shouldn't have a free ride… Society shouldn't be paying for their wrongs" (Eisen 2014: 319). Consumer logic is thought to eliminate the free rider problem because it holds that incarcerated people must pay back the state for having to incapacitate them in the first place, which is considered simultaneously both a rehabilitative and security commodity that the state and taxpayers should not have to bear alone. The state believes it deserves payment because incarcerated people—as criminals—are especially undeserving of this free rider status and should be held responsible for what they consume.

Neoliberal governance facilitated the widespread adoption of consumer logic across a myriad of social institutions, with criminal justice institutions representing both pervasive and pernicious examples of the expansion and far-reaching consequences of neoliberal thought and practice. The rise of neoliberal policies coincided with the development of neo-conservatism that asserted the need for moral discipline and personal responsibility as the cornerstones of punishment (Garland 2001). The interplay between neoliberal ideologies and the foundations of individual responsibility coalesced in practices that conceived of monetary payment as pivotal for atonement and rehabilitation and necessarily expanded the reach of carceral solutions to governance. Such practices reframed the use of the criminal justice system not as a free service but as a service debt, to be borne by the user. By casting system-constrained individuals as both

free-loaders and as morally deficient, neoliberal governance as penology dictates that the only atonement is through monetarily satisfying one's debt to society as an individual consumer responsibility.

This debt was once predominantly paid through time incarcerated, with the negative impact of incapacitation, family separation, and loss of freedom being sufficient punishment for crimes against the state. However, in a neoliberal atmosphere, the criminal justice system expands in line with the growing fiscal needs of the state, finding innovative ways to increase the costs of criminal justice processing and ensnaring individuals further in the system as liable consumers. Consequently, indebtedness to the state results in increasing surveillance of not only the individual, their family, partners, and communities, but also their financial assets (Harris 2016). The expansion of carcerality through financial debt represents what has been increasingly referred to as predatory systems and policies that become a perpetual trap, deepening inequality and stratification for individuals and communities of color especially (Miller et al. 2018).

While neoliberal governance has pervaded the criminal justice system for decades, the full scope and consequences of the resulting policies and practices came to light through the publication of the Ferguson Report, which highlighted, in the starkest of terms, the linkage between neoliberal governance, the criminal justice system, and the predatory nature of the state (Page and Soss 2017; Sances and You 2017; Goldstein et al. 2018; US Department of Justice 2015). Subsequent research has shown that Ferguson was not the beginning or end of such practices, nor was it an outlier (Henricks and Harvey 2017; Harris 2016; Fernandes et al. 2019). The predatory practices outlined in the Ferguson Report were seen throughout states and jurisdictions, representing an interlocking web of systems that aim to dually punish those framed as utilizing court or incarceration systems while simultaneously extracting resources from the

same users, often the most vulnerable individuals and communities. We suggest consumerism functions as an institutional logic across social institutions in the neoliberal era to legitimize the intensification of capitalist social relations that would otherwise be considered predation. The nature of these predatory practices rests not only in their ability to extend punishment beyond the serving of a sentence or end of adjudication, but also in the ways such practices increase surveillance and the threat of re-apprehension (Brayne 2014). Page and Soss (2017), among others, have linked the rise in predatory policies and practices to the foundations of neoliberal governance, prioritizing fiscal needs and moralistic punishment over the pursuit of justice.

As a legal template, we argue pay-to-stay fees and recoupment strategies provide further evidence of consumerism in the criminal justice system, grounded in the premise that charging incarcerated people prevents the "free rider problem." As a result of their criminality, incarcerated people are seen as unfairly and unlawfully consuming, causing an increased portion of the financial burden for corrections to be placed on everyone else. Our analysis of the framing and justification of pay-to-stay within consumer logic reveals the ways in which the criminal justice system operates as a captive market with an endless supply of captive consumers. We suggest that incarcerated people are arguably the most vulnerable to this type of predation given they constitute structurally and physically captive consumers, representing the most extreme version of what scholars would define as a captive market.

Though consumer logic promotes the supposed free trade of goods and services, as substantiated by neoliberalism's cultural scripts of individual responsibility and carceral expansion, in reality consumer logic legitimates a state monopoly over incarceration as a public commodity. We show how lawmakers achieve this arrangement by portraying incarcerated people as free-riding consumers of incarceration rather than as captive consumers. From

mandated reporting of assets to the expansion of viable funds available for capture by the state, the ever-changing landscape of pay-to-stay encapsulates the driving tenets of neoliberal thought and practice that inform broader shifts that further tie the incarcerated person to the producer-consumer framework. In this landscape, pay-to-stay represents not only a tool for revenue generation, but increasingly, a systematic and widespread drive to further expand the systems of control, locking incarcerated populations into unseen contracts and payment responsibilities that exceed the bounds of punishment. Pay-to-stay is unique in its use of lawsuits as reimbursement for the per diem costs of incarceration, yet the practice is wholly tied to a logic that pervades carceral and non-carceral systems alike. Similar machinations are seen in other realms such as probation and child support recoupments, which also position justice-involved individuals as users of state goods and services and hold them accountable through the threat of reincarceration or a host of other punitive sanctions (Harris 2016; Link and Roman 2017; Ruhland et al. 2020).

In linking incarceration to a consumer framework and by conceiving of incarcerated people as consumers of their own captivity, the state, in adopting and expanding pay-to-stay as a legal template aligns itself in the movement towards monetizing punishment, a consequence of the broader emergence of neoliberal governance. Accordingly, the state can produce without much oversight an accounting of loss, harm, and damages rendered, casting the state and its citizens as victims of the statutory duty to provide the services of incarceration. Pay-to-stay is legitimated through the commodification of incarceration, extending the boundaries of punishment by locking incarcerated individuals into the "punishment continuum" and framing payment as an individual consumer responsibility. This project aids in fleshing out how pay-to-stay expands the carceral reach of institutions into the lives of people under the guise of consumer relations, successfully extending the boundaries of punishment, surveillance, and

linkages to broader state institutions. Such an extension results in the curtailing of freedoms, liberties and the rights of full citizenship beyond the length of a sentence, thereby creating within the incarcerated individual a captivity that persists beyond its legal bounds. Without an end and without limits, the state in suing incarcerated people for the cost of incarceration, creates an interlocking feedback loop of predation through fiscal surveillance, and in essence, an incarceration without end. We see these consequences of neoliberal governance across social institutions, where through the application of rational financial principles, millions of people in the United States are held liable as consumers of public commodities that were once considered civil rights. This characterization of human worth and culpability creates patterns of relations where social institutions respond punitively to nonpayment. In this social world, those who accumulate debt are considered irresponsible offenders engaging in a willful act of defiance against producers.

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FIGURES

Figure 1. Offender Financial Status Report



ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

OFFENDER FINANCIAL STATUS REPORT

Offender Name: [redacted] ID#: [redacted] Age: 60

Marital Status: ☑ Married ☐ Single ☐ Divorced

Number of children & other dependents: _____ and list their ages: _____

In accordance with 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6, which mandates recovery of costs of incarceration from committed persons, you are required to provide the Department of Corrections with information regarding your financial assets. "Asset" means property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due to you. The Attorney General may review this information and may seek reimbursement to the State for the cost of your care. You may be required to update this information in the future.

Completion of this form is MANDATORY under 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6. Failure to fully cooperate in revealing your assets shall be considered for purposes of a parole determination and may subject you to the loss of up to 180 days of good time credit and other disciplinary sanctions in accordance with 20 Ill. Adm. Code Ch. I, Part 504.

I have the following assets under my own name or jointly held with another person or persons:

"Fox Valley Credit Union"

Asset	Dollar Amount	Location (specify)
Cash	$63,000	FOX VALLEY CREDIT
Bank/Credit Union Accounts	$4,000	ICF
Previously Earned Salary or Wages		
Previously Earned Bonuses		
Annuities		
Social Security Income/Payments		
Workers Compensation Income/Payments		
Veteran's Compensation		
Retirement Benefits		
Other Pension Benefits (Specify)		
Real Estate (House or other property)	$675,000	406 [illegible] DR
Stocks/Bonds		
Lockbox/value		
Other (such as jewelry, art work, collectables, etc.)	$4,000	AT HOME
Total Assets:		

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Distribution: Master File; Offender

Side 1

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EXHIBIT C

Figure 2. Bill of Incarceration Liability vs. Recoverable Assets

Institution	Date In	Date Out	# of Days	F/Y	Annual COI	Actual COI
Stateville	07/11/2000	06/30/2001	349	2001	$25,330.00	$24,556.03
Stateville	06/30/2011	07/18/2001	18	2002	$25,709.00	$ 1,285.45
Menard	07/18/2001	06/30/2002	342	2002	$20,858.00	$19,815.10
Menard	06/30/2002	12/18/2002	168	2003	$19,190.00	$ 8,955.33
Pontiac	12/18/2002	03/26/2003	98	2003	$32,121.00	$ 8,744.05
Menard	03/26/2003	06/30/2003	94	2003	$19,190.00	$ 5,010.72
Menard	06/30/2003	06/30/2004	360	2004	$18,406.00	$18,406.00
Menard	06/30/2004	06/30/2005	360	2005	$19,047.00	$19,047.00
Menard	06/30/2005	06/30/2006	360	2006	$18,355.00	$18,355.00
Menrad	06/30/2006	06/30/2007	360	2007	$18,808.00	$18,808.00
Menard	06/30/2007	06/30/2008	360	2008	$20,736.00	$20,736.00
Menard	06/30/2008	05/13/2009	313	2009	$21,793.00	$18,947.80
Western	05/13/2009	06/30/2009	47	2009	$18,691.00	$ 2,440.21
Western	06/30/2009	06/30/2010	360	2010	$16,056.16	$16,056.16
Western	06/30/2010	12/22/2010	172	2011	$16,550.09	$ 7,907.27
Lawrence	12/22/2010	06/30/2011	188	2011	$16,679.92	$ 8,710.62
Lawrence	06/30/2011	06/30/2012	360	2012	$16,836.11	$16,836.11
Lawrence	06/30/2012	06/30/2013	360	2013	$16,622.58	$16,622.58
Lawrence	06/30/2013	05/31/2014	330	2014	$16,622.58	$15,237.36
Totals			4,999			$266,476.79
Recoverable Asset - IDOC Trust Fund Balance as of 06/27/2014.						$10,912.06

Figure 3. Inmate Trust Fund Transaction Statement

Date: 9/9/2014
Time: 12:45pm
d_list_inmate_trans_statement_composite

Logan Correctional Center
Trust Fund
Inmate Transaction Statement

Page 1

REPORT CRITERIA - Date: Start thru End; Inmate: [redacted] Active Status Only ? : No; Print Restrictions ? : Yes;
Transaction Type: All Transaction Types; Print Furloughs / Restitutions ? : Yes; Include Inmate Totals ? : Yes; Print Balance Errors Only ? : No

Inmate: [redacted] Housing Unit: [redacted] Released

Date	Source	Transaction Type	Batch	Reference #	Description	Amount	Balance
					Beginning Balance:		0.00
03/13/13	Mail Room	04 Intake and Transfers In	072291	93622	Lincoln C.C.	3,513.03	3,513.03
03/20/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	0797112	783192	Commissary	-148.37	3,364.66
04/04/13	Mail Room	01 MO/Checks (Not Held)	094269	02709975	J P Morgan	200.00	3,564.66
04/13/13	Payroll	20 Payroll Adjustment	103191		P/R month of 3 2013	7.20	3,571.86
04/15/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	105792	785202	Commissary	-279.18	3,292.68
04/16/13	Disbursements	82 Debts due to State (non-postage)	106391	Chk #47329	[redacted] Inv. Date: 03/16/2013	-61.30	3,231.38
04/17/13	Mail Room	04 Intake and Transfers In	107291	93660	Lincoln C.C.	6.22	3,237.60
04/17/13	Disbursements	88 FORWARD FUNDS	107391	Chk #47418	[redacted] Inv. Date: 04/17/2013	-350.00	2,887.60
05/03/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	123792	787027	Commissary	-246.44	2,641.16
05/07/13	Mail Room	01 MO/Checks (Not Held)	1272103	02750756	JP Morgan Chase Bank	200.00	2,841.16
05/14/13	Payroll	20 Payroll Adjustment	134191		P/R month of 4 2013	13.23	2,854.39
05/15/13	Disbursements	80 Postage	135391	Chk #47629	[redacted] Inv. Date: 05/13/2013	-.46	2,853.93
05/15/13	Disbursements	80 Postage	135391	Chk #47629	[redacted] Inv. Date: 05/13/2013	-2.30	2,851.63
06/03/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	1437112	789053	Commissary	-224.32	2,627.31
06/03/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	1437112	789054	Commissary	-3.00	2,624.31
06/03/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	1437112	789056	Commissary	-7.13	2,617.18
06/03/13	Disbursements	88 FORWARD FUNDS	144391	Chk #47898	[redacted] Inv. Date: 05/24/2013	-45.00	2,572.18
06/12/13	Mail Room	01 MO/Checks (Not Held)	1502103	02778905	JP Morgan	200.00	2,772.18
06/12/13	Mail Room	02 MO/Checks (Held)	1632103	02780147	J.P. Morgan	200.00	2,972.18
06/14/13	Payroll	20 Payroll Adjustment	165191		P/R month of 5 2013	15.00	2,987.18
06/14/13	Disbursements	82 Debts due to State (non-postage)	165391	Chk #48064	[redacted] Inv. Date: 06/07/2013	-5.00	2,982.18
06/17/13	Mail Room	02 MO/Checks (Held)	1682103	02780140	JP Morgan	200.00	3,182.18
06/17/13	Mail Room	02 MO/Checks (Held)	1682103	02780139	JP Morgan	200.00	3,382.18
06/17/13	Mail Room	02 MO/Checks (Held)	1682103	02780145	JP Morgan	200.00	3,582.18
06/17/13	Mail Room	02 MO/Checks (Held)	1682103	02780141	JP Morgan	200.00	3,782.18
06/17/13	Mail Room	02 MO/Checks (Held)	1682103	02780142	JP Morgan	200.00	3,982.18
06/17/13	Mail Room	02 MO/Checks (Held)	1682103	02780143	JP Morgan	200.00	4,182.18
06/17/13	Mail Room	02 MO/Checks (Held)	1682103	02780144	JP Morgan	200.00	4,382.18
06/17/13	Mail Room	02 MO/Checks (Held)	1682103	02780146	JP Morgan	200.00	4,582.18
06/18/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	169796	791053	Commissary	-149.71	4,432.47
06/18/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	169796	791059	Commissary	-95.11	4,337.36
06/24/13	Mail Room	02 MO/Checks (Held)	1752103	02780564	JP Morgan	200.00	4,537.36
07/08/13	Payroll	20 Payroll Adjustment	189191		P/R month of 6 2013	15.00	4,552.36
07/11/13	Mail Room	01 MO/Checks (Not Held)	1922103	02811220	JP Morgan	200.00	4,752.36
07/11/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	1927112	793046	Commissary	-328.72	4,423.64
07/11/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	1927112	793047	Commissary	-2.99	4,420.65
07/11/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	1927112	793054	Commissary	-16.26	4,404.39
07/16/13	Disbursements	82 Debts due to State (non-postage)	197391	Chk #48319	[redacted] Inv. Date: 07/01/2013	-5.00	4,399.39
07/17/13	Disbursements	88 FORWARD FUNDS	198391	Chk #48353	[redacted] Inv. Date: 07/17/2013	-350.00	4,049.39
07/31/13	Disbursements	88 FORWARD FUNDS	212391	Chk #48436	[redacted] Inv. Date: 07/31/2013	-50.00	3,999.39
08/05/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	217792	795029	Commissary	-320.65	3,678.74
08/07/13	Point of Sale	60 Commissary	219792	795374	Commissary	11.68	3,690.42
08/13/13	Payroll	20 Payroll Adjustment	225191		P/R month of 7 2013	15.00	3,705.42
08/13/13	Mail Room	02 MO/Checks (Held)	2252103	02841874	Morgan, JP	200.00	3,905.42